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1 INTRODUCTION  
All entrepreneurial activity is characterized by handling risk in a proper way. This concerns technical risk 
issues in the same way as it concerns commercial risk. In both cases all possible needs to be done to avoid 
certain situations which cause injury to persons or damage to objects. This includes physical impairment 
as well as financial distress to individuals and companies. In a somewhat more abstract view to such situ-
ations all hazard must be avoided to some degree and therefore their variation is only a matter of scaling. 
Based on this we propose a general approach to deal with the probability of risks and an adequate descrip-
tion of methods to avoid safety hazard. 
2 RISK MANAGEMENT  
2.1 Definition of Risk  
In order to define risk according to Zimmermann, Eber et al (2008) for a specific issue we consider a 
space of states given by the set of all existing variables where a state is defined as a point. Time is also 
considered one specific variable t. The development of a system is described as a path through the space 
of states. If all states and interactions are unambiguously defined the development of a system can be pre-
dicted with perfect precision for all times and no risk occurs. Yet as in general the development of some 
variables r(t) is not completely foreseeable and therefore some deviation = −δ s r(t) (t) (t) from the expected 
path s(t)occurs defined as risk. Figure 1 indicates an exemplary corridor of states along the time axis rep-
resenting possible deviation paths r(t)  where for clearness the space of states is reduced to two dimen-
sions as the ordinates. 
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Without losing generality this concept is applicable for the development of circumstances which affect 
the process of construction like e.g. the environmental temperature as a failure criterion for appropriate 
pouring concrete activities as well as the unforeseeable detailed properties of rock to be drilled and thus 
influencing strategies of securing measures. 
 
 
Figure 1. Deviation from an assumed path 
 
Well known models make use of this concept by considering well determined functions of interaction be-
tween variables and adding a term representing uncertainty. E.g. the LEN-model represents the interac-
tion of agent and principal regarding their individual interests and the resulting effort on a common pro-
ject, see e.g. Picot et al (2008), which gives some recommendations about the agreements of the 
respective contract. In this model the wages are linearly modeled as = +0 1s(x) s s x  where the production 
volume = ϑx x(a, ) is a function of the effort a and some unknown influencing circumstances ϑ which are 
only determined by a given distribution. Making use of exponential utility functions for both the partici-
pants (Principal:  −ρ −= − (x s(x))G(x) e  and  Agent  − −= − r(s V(a))H(s,a) e ) the resulting constant wages are ( )= − − σ ⋅0 0 1s H s ² 1 ² r /2 while the optimal output related wage fraction turns out to be ( )−= + σ ⋅ 1opt1s 1 2 ² r . In 
the end the effort of the agent is optimized as ( )−= = + σ ⋅ 1opt 1a s /2 2 4 ² r . In such a context, insecurities ob-
viously lead to a perceptible variation of strategies regarding the intended future behaviour in order to 
minimize risk, represented by the variance σ of the unknown parameter.  
 
2.2 Classical Risk Management 
Traditionally risk management focuses on the calculation of risk consequences in units of possible dam-
age or injury to persons times the respective probability of the occurrence of risk. The integral of this 
product over time gives the overall risk of a specific parameter for the total system. In order to identify all 
possible risks tools like checklists and risk maps are used as completeness of the list of risks considered is 
essential to any strategic decision about handling the situation. After that, risks are classified into groups 
by criteria allowing to treat them accordingly, e.g. “insignificant”, “reasonable”, “fatal”, “existence 
threatening”. 
Some of the identified risks can possibly be transferred to other units or organizations; some can be se-
cured by purchasing appropriate insurances. Sometimes modifying technical methods, designs or sched-
ules allow eliminating risks completely or at least minimizing them. After that risks can be sorted to crite-
ria regarding the probability of occurrence or the possible hazard consequences. On this background 
finally strategic considerations may lead to specific decisions about the remaining risk which is to be 
borne or ignored.   
2.3 Surcharges due to Risky Issues 
Since the direction of ( )tδ  is not determined further, this approach is capable to handle losses as well as 
gain. In general symmetry should be expected regarding loss and gain, but for some other reasons, which 
are not to be discussed here, it is known that the loss side weights much more. This is well understood as 
chances are gladly accepted while negative risks in many cases need to be avoided absolutely. Yet this 
property results from characteristics of the mental attitude while scheduling and does not affect the con-
cept presented here.  
 
260
 
Risks that cannot be transferred to other organizations need to be covered or ignored. Therefore the con-
ventional method to deal with commercial risks is to add surcharges to calculated costs. The technical 
pendant to such measure is to add safety margins to parameters responsible for stability. 
Therefore the question of the amount of safety i.e. volume of surcharges or safety margins becomes 
crucial in every respect. In many cases an expedient value can be derived from the mean value of the re-
spective risk resulting in the average gain or loss over a sufficiently high number of trials. Yet average 
processing requires the solution of at some problems: 
At first all statistical estimations are based on high numbers of trials which are given only in very few 
cases. In most situations only probabilities for the occurrence of single events are derived from the fre-
quency of occurrence of a number of investigated projects. Yet probabilities give absolutely no infor-
mation about the single event, neither for a specific commercial project nor for the absolute stability of a 
mechanical situation. Therefore as long as only probabilities are given and not absolute limits or at least 
limits which are violated with definitely ignorable probability, no statement can be made for a single situ-
ation. 
Secondly it turns out to be difficult to find a sufficient number of experienced situations to form a valid 
database for statistical investigations. On some aspects, specifically regarding constructional details there 
are sets of data available e.g. in steel construction. In some other respects most of the situations available 
for investigation differ too much to be taken representative which is certainly typical for production pro-
cesses and supposedly for most of the processes dealing with natural resources like geotechnical. 
Thirdly in consequence every surcharge based on average situations is invalid for a specific situation. 
In case of an occurring risk the maximum hazard is pending instead of a mean hazard even if the proba-
bility of occurrence was originally low enough to expect only bearable consequences. On the other hand 
if the considered risk does not turn up every surcharge becomes obsolete and too large. As a consequence 
such experience is likely to lead to ignoring risks as the evaluation is based on a subjective background. 
Any parameter calculated correctly in order to fulfill the determined requirements and increased by a sur-
charge which meets the real average risk is likely to be abolished in the run-up because no contract and no 
tender will be accepted on this basis. Yet the personal acceptance of risk and risk hazard is commonly 
very low, safety is on high priority due to good reasons. 
Finally decisions are made due to the theory of decisions not on the “basis of risk” if there are no de-
termined values to rely on but on the “basis of insecurity”. In other words risk calculations are done but 
the final decision considers only well known facts i.e. crucial limits calculated from the possible results. If 
such processing fails risks tend to be ignored.  
3 REDUCING RISK BY ACTIVITIES  
3.1 Understanding Risk Management  
Rarely formulated but widely used and in detail proposed by Zimmermann, Eber et al. (2008) is a very 
basic understanding of managing risks. The fundamental concept is the replacement of probabilities lead-
ing to insecure high efforts by specific activities which reduce the risk definitely to bearable remaining 
values but require the use of resources and acceptance of additional costs. In contrast to surcharges which 
will only in average cases cover the risk consequences i.e. are not applicable for unique situations, such 
activities are affordable constants leaving no unbearable risks. 
3.2 Risk in Construction Management 
Such measures are well known and widely used in construction management as well as in designing con-
structional details.  
Figure 2 visualizes the development of secureness of the construction costs for a infrastructure project. 
Without making use of any activities no effort is spent on risk management and the expected costs are not 
obtainable. A first estimation of costs in early phases of a project where only very few valid information 
is available relies on known parameters like cost per m2 usable area or net volume. These processes pro-
vide some good estimation, accurate enough to enable an investor to decide about terminating or continu-
ing the project. The gain of accuracy is low at this stage but the spent effort is also limited. The resulting 
distribution of possible cost is symmetrical because the representation of the building by comparable pro-
jects includes incompleteness as well as overestimation. During the process of contracting the risk needs 
to be minimized further. This is done by detailed investigation of activities regarding scheduled methods, 
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duration and costs which again yields a very narrow distribution of possible costs but also requires addi-
tional effort raising the total sum. Further activities alike which we call explicitly “risk management” re-
place insecure parameters by secure activities accepting their additions costs. E.g. risky activities due to 
their explicit dependence on open parameters like weather conditions are modified by choosing a differ-
ent method of production which is not affected by such situations but more expensive or disadvantageous 
in some other respect, yet acceptable. If done correctly we expect the distribution to become asymmetric 
due to the actively integrated limitation of insecureness at the top end. After all, the result is expected to 
match the predictions on the basis of successful risk management. 
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Figure 2. Development of Risk in Steps of Risk Management 
 
3.3 Risk in Mechanical Engineering 
Regarding constructional details the same procedure is well known: If the stability of a specific system is 
given only by a distribution of probabilities the respective dimensions are chosen to reduce the remaining 
risk to an acceptable measure: 
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Figure 3. Development of Risk Regarding the Design of a Constructional Element 
 
An element determined by the average stability will fail e.g. with a probability of 50%. Since a construc-
tion system usually comprises a set of elements where the failure of a single one or of very few elements 
already jeopardized the total system such proceeding is in no way acceptable. In this case it is of no great 
help that the other half of the elements is more stable than assumed due to the statistical distribution. The 
solution is to increase relevant dimensions, adopt additional expenses in order to reduce the risk of failure 
to an acceptably low remaining risk in accordance to the overall requirements. 
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3.4 Insurance Risk Management 
Processes of insurance business are generally based on the same methods: A single individual is subjected 
to a particular risk, e.g. health risk or the risk of a car accident. The probability is fairly low but the possi-
ble hazard can be tremendous which leads to an unbearable situation. The average risk is taken to be ac-
ceptable but any expenses are superfluous if the risk does not occur. Yet if the risk occurs the conse-
quences exceed every acceptable limit. In the view of the concerned individual a measure is required to 
limit the risk that is the expenses but cover the possible “worst case” consequences. 
A large amount of individuals allows for a different point of view. The integral over all risks needs to 
be covered and is the sum of all risks or equivalently the average risk times the number of individuals. 
Therefore in this case an average risk is applicable due to the large amount of comparable situations and 
the existence of a mechanism to couple the individual situations.  
Let an insecure value ix  e.g. the expected cost to cover a specific event be described by a distribution 
of probability iP(x) and the risk iR be given by the variance σ 2i iR . For a single individual respectively a 
single risk issue the squared risk is just ( )σ = −∫ 22i i i m,i i idx x x P(x ) . The cumulated risk of two events of equal 
distribution is given by the convolution = −∫2 1 1 iP (x) dx'P (x ')P (x x') . Continued to higher number j of cumu-
lated situations we find a sequence of convolutions: jP (x) . The solution can be obtained by means of simu-
lation but can be for a basic example shown on the distribution according to A. K. Erlang. The Erlang dis-
tribution describes the additive accumulation of a number of elements which are equally given by 
originally exponential distributions. The resulting distribution is in dependence of the number of elements 
z and the mean value mx : 
( ) ( )
−  = − −  
z 1
m m
z zxP(x) x exp
x z 1 ! x
                                                               (1) 
The standard deviation is easily derived as σ =2 2x / z and develops to zero with the rise of the number of 
elements. Therefore in order to level down risk to a ratio of only 10% of the mean value at least a number 
of ( )= σ = =22 2z x / 0,1 100 is required. Other distributions show different characteristics but the tendency is 
equivalent. The fact that mean values cannot be applied on single issues is trivial but this estimation al-
lows to predict a minimum number of elements to be cumulated in order make use of averages. Figure 4 
shows the development of risk reduction due to the accumulation of issues.  
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Figure 4. Development of Risk in Accumulating Situations 
 
Thus insuring a risk – if possible – follows the same principle of implementing means to limit the risk 
taking into account the necessary expenses.  
The remaining risk comprises two major elements. At first there is generally a remaining probability of 
risk consequences to exceed the insured hazard as for example the rare possibility of an extreme spring-
tide. Secondly the risk of something unwanted to happen and causing unlimited hazard is converted to the 
limited risk of having spent limited effort to means which are probably not required.   
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4 RISK IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
Considering risk and risk consequences becomes more difficult if complex systems comprising several 
parameters underlying different distributions of uncertainty are considered. Within systems not only the 
number of risky issues causes uncertainty but also their interaction introducing matters of risk propaga-
tion. 
 
4.1 Decomposition of Systems 
Derived from the theory of systems the uncertainty of a complex system can be reduced by decomposing 
to a number of subsystems. This concept is based on the assumption that on each separation process all 
interactions between the remaining subsystems are fully understood and can be formulated. Furthermore a 
system modeled as a graph comprises nodes and edges. Broken down to the finest possible resolution 
nodes and edges are most simple and contain only one variable or interaction. On this background the 
“volume” of nodes and edges can be rated equally valued regarding their contribution to the total system.  
Thus, the number n of separated subsystems implies a number = −m n(n 1) /2 of fully understood relation-
ships where not existing interactions are also taken as determinedly understood. 
If a parameter of the total system can be estimated to an accuracy of ε we expect every subsystem to 
be estimated to the same degree ε . Yet the arrangement of the separated system comprises n insecure el-
ements and a number of m secured interactions leading to a total insecurity of 
⋅εε = ⋅ε + = +n
2n / (n m)
1 n
                                                                                       (2) 
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Figure 4. Reduction of Insecureness by the Introduction of Subsystems 
 
The limit of such decomposing is given by the consideration of the validity of perfect knowledge of inter-
actions. Since the number of relationships is increasing to the power of two the problem of identifying 
and really understanding every single interaction rises as well. 
Nevertheless we can derive from such consideration that if the interactions are described well the 
overall risk decreases to dealing with single risks. Therefore we need to identify the network of interac-
tion and the propagation of risk within the network.   
 
4.2 Impact of the Structure of Networks 
Networks of interaction can be modeled making use of graphs. Subsystems and their respective interac-
tion are represented by nodes and edges where the presumption of causality of all interrelations requires 
the graph to be directed. 
Any assumed propagation of risks δ >Q 0 would definitively lead to infinite results if the existence of 
loops was not ruled out. Therefore we assume risk interaction diagrams to be network plans according to 
the definition of the theory of graphs, comprising one source, one sink and no loops. Such graphs can be 
sorted by ranks and a maximum number Γ of ranks can be determined. Furthermore the average number 
of sources for a closing node can be measured as the parameter ς of interoperability while the average 
number of sinks to a source node is measured as the parameter ξ of impact. Finally we describe the num-
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ber of elements per rank through the parameter of parallel operationsp . On this background the number 
of nodes affected can be estimated to Ω Γ⋅ p  
With no doubt the complete elimination of loops is not possible. Yet including loops obstructs any ap-
proach to analytical investigations. Therefore recursion is taken into account in a different way “spread” 
all over the otherwise well determined network and modeled as the parameter of recursionβ , defined lat-
er.  
5 RISK INTERACTION 
Factors of success are defined as a set of production factors which are directly interfaced to the success of 
a project, easily to be measured and controlled and give a well established tool to control the progress of a 
project to success while the actual success cannot be measured and controlled directly and in advance. 
The same structure can be made use of by defining factors of risk which can be measured and con-
trolled in advance or during the progress of the project or system. This allows controlling the overall risk 
as long as the singular risk issues are identified in time and their interaction to the total risk is understood. 
Such proceeding requires identifying factors of risk first, then defining their scheduled progression and 
finally monitoring them continuously. In order not only to observe deviations but to control those meth-
ods need to be found which allow acting upon these factors and closing the feedback loop. Only then a 
system can be kept within the designed corridor of states and occurring risks can be managed in a way 
that eliminates terms of probability. 
 
5.1 Composition of Risk in a Network 
In order to model risk issues as a number of ς risk factors the corridor of states requires a definition for 
each factor. Let every factor iF  contribute if  to the production or development of a value Q during the pro-
cess time t.  Then we define the rate 
∂ =∂ ∏ iQ ft                                                                                                                        (3) 
If all the factors are at the scheduled level the rate of production/development is on schedule and the pro-
duction/development time as well as the desired quality or result will be on schedule too. Any deviation 
δ if contributes to the overall development:  
( ) ( )( )( )∂ = = + δ = + δ + δ + δ ≈ + δ +∂ ∏ ∏i i i 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3Q f f f f f f f f f ... f f f ... f f f ... higher _orderst  
( ) ( ) δ δ∂ ≈ + = + = + δ = + ∆ ∂  ∑ ∑ ∑i 0 i0 0 0 R,i 0i i
fF fQ F F 1 F 1 f F 1
t f f
,                                              (4) 
where = ∏0 iF f  is the scheduled rate and δ = δR,i i if f / f  is the relative deviation of the risk factors. Further-
more the cumulated deviation is ∆ = δ∑ R,if . If the parallel factors can be assumed to be independent of 
each other ∆ is of the order ζ otherwise and valid in most cases of the order ζ .  
 
Normalizing the developing process to an average time of a step and to a standard production =0F 1  the 
risk propagation per step is estimated to δ ≈ ∆ ζQ ( )  and the cumulated risk of a linear risk chain of length 
Γ comes to be Γδ ≈ Γ∆ ζQ ( )  
5.2 Risk Propagation in a Network 
The linear approach to the propagation of a risk is in most cases not applicable due to the complex struc-
ture of interacting factors. Yet the number of interactions is in general not as large as the theoretical limit 
given above and can therefore be reduced if the description of systems structure is known or can be de-
rived. The following concept is taken from an approach estimating consequences of breaking up a system 
to subsystems. In the considered situation the volume to be dispersed is equivalent to the risk δ ≈ ∆ ζQ ( )  of 
which we evaluate the consequences.  
Let a system of volume ( )= δ ≈ ∆ ζV Q ( )  influence and therefore be distributed on a number of Ω  
branches (sub nodes) using a tree structure. The volume of the subnodes is ΩV /  if the risk is divided on 
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the branches otherwise as assumed here fully transmitted. Furthermore let any insecurity induced by a 
separation be given by the linear equation = η +T V C as a fraction η of the respective volume and a con-
stant value c due to the fact of the separation. Then the insecurity of the connecting node is = η⋅ +1T V c  
while the insecurity of the new subnodes is = Ω⋅ ⋅η+2T (V c) .  
The affected subnodes are possibly interacting to some degree. This ranges from no interaction at all 
(i.e. =w 0 ) through the case of each node interacting with two next neighbors ( =w 2 ) to systems where 
each node is actively connected to every other node ( = Ω Ω −w ( 1) ). The complexity parameter [ ]α∈ 0..1  
allows modeling the variety of situations: α= Ω Ω −w ( 1) . The increase of insecureness due to the additional 
interactions of the subnodes is accordingly ( )α= Ω Ω − ⋅ η⋅ +3T ( 1) V c . The parameter α is understood as the 
ratio of the dimension of the space of states to the theoretically maximum dimension and for not too small 
values compatible to the definition of the degree of information according to Shannon (1948).  
Finally each interaction of two subnodes is likely to cause the further need of adaption of adjacent 
nodes. Therefore the degree of transmitting insecureness from one node to another including the case of 
looped interaction needs to be modeled. The effective number of interactions can be formulated as 
= ⋅β + ⋅β + ⋅β +0 1 2W w w w ... if the recursion parameter [ ]β∈ 0..1 represents the ratio of propagation. Since 
this is a geometric series we obtain ( ) ( ) ( )∞= β = β − β − = β −∑ iW w w 1 / 1 w / 1 and the additional insecure-
ness is ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )∞α α
=
= Ω Ω − η + β = Ω Ω − η + −β∑ i3
i 0
T 1 V c 1 V c / 1 . 
5.3 Development of a risk issue 
All together we model the development of risk as = µη + νT V c where ( ) ( )αµ = Ω Ω − −β + Ω +1 / 1 1  and ( ) ( )αν = Ω Ω − −β + Ω +1 / 1 1 . The considered volume is given by = δ ≈ ∆ ζV Q ( )  . For sufficiently large Ω  the 
linear terms as well as the constant terms are not significant. The factors are reduced 
to ( ) ( )αµ Ω Ω − −β 1 / 1  and ( ) ( )αν Ω Ω − −β 1 / 1 . 
 
Thus the development of a risk issue throughout a complex system is characterized by  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )α αηΩ Ω − ∆ ζ −β + ⋅Ω Ω − −βT 1 ( ) / 1 c 1 / 1                                                 (5) 
                                         The second term is not dependant of the actual risk and therefore mirrors the generally acquired risk re-
sulting from the fact that structures exist and cause multiple interrelations. This only leads to the never-
theless most important recommendation to keep structures clean and small. 
In contrast to this the first term mirrors the development of a specific risk through a given structure.  
The character of the volume term is dominated by the parameter of complexity, the factor of recursion 
and the number of subnodes. Since the risk to be transferred is estimated in the chapter before, the ratio 
η can be assumed to be unity. In particular any development runs with the rise Ω  to the power of α .  
The parameter of complexity α is spread over all the structure. Therefore it is advisable to define the 
development by introducing ranks r . Since α is the ratio of existing interactions to possible interactions 
the expression α⋅ Γr / equals the share of complexity for one step in the sequence of ranks. With this we 
obtain as a coarse estimation (where the −ΩV  term compensates for the neglected linear term if β  is 
small): 
( ) ( ) ( )α Γ +α ΓΩ Ω − ∆ ζ −β Ω ∆ ζ −β r/ 1 r/T 1 ( ) / 1 ( ) / 1                                            (6) 
 
Thus the factor of risk propagation for the progression of one increment of ranks can be estimated to 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )+ ++α Γ α Γ α Γ α Γ α Γ
+α Γ α Γ α Γ
Ω ∆ ζ −β Ω Ω Ωω = = = ΩΩ ∆ ζ −β Ω Ω
r 1 r 11 / / r/ /
/
1 r/ r/ r/
( ) / 1
( ) / 1
                                (7) 
 
In considering Ω  as the number of affected i.e. subsequent nodes in a structure we assume a node where 
risk propagation via different paths is counted only once and transferred only as one risk issue. As this is 
not valid in many cases we need to replace Ω  by the number of affected nodes even if they are partly 
identical which leads to the use of  ΓΩ = ξ . Herewith we obtain: 
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( )Γ+αξ ∆ ζ −β rT ( ) / 1  and αω ξ                                                                       (8)                                                      
Obviously the recursion factor only scales the propagation of risk but does not influence the character of 
propagation. On very simple models α = 0  we obtain constant propagation as expected; i.e. every single 
risk issue is simply transferred to the final result. Yet as complexity rises to e.g. α = 0.1and structures ex-
pand to e.g. only 5 subsequent sink nodes per source we obtain clearly more than a factor of unity for eve-
ry step of development which leads to exponential rise of effect.  
6 CONTROLLING RISK 
From the previously derived results we find clearly that there is no way to reduce risk by only reducing 
probabilities or risk hazard because of the complex structures of risk propagation which increase any val-
ue however small it is to unacceptably large consequences. From this we conclude the establishment of 
methods capable to control a risk during the time t in order to lead Q back to its originally intended value.  
Preconditioned the risk to develop like ( )Γ+αξ ∆ ζ −β rT ( ) / 1 , some recommendations can be derived: 
Measurement of the respective variables needs to be taken every interval or step r0 and the deviation 
needs to be evaluated. Immediately, appropriate activities must be initiated to correct the situation. The 
power of correction λ following the same characteristics as the deviation itself is closely related to the ac-
cepted deviation value, the point of time/step/rank when the activity is started and the point of time 
(=step/rank) 0r when the situation is expected to be completely returned to the initial state. Then the de-
velopment of the deviation during steps dr  is to be compensated during the next γ dr steps. Thus we find: ( ) ( )Γ+αγ Γ+ γ− αξ ∆ ζ −β = λξ ∆ ζ −βd dr ( 1) r( ) / 1 ( ) / 1 which solves easily to αγ γ− αξ = λξd dr ( 1) r
 
and thus a power of cor-
rection 
αγ γ− α −α αλ = ξ ξ = ξ = ξd d d dr ( 1) r r r/ 1 /                                                                (9) 
 which allows to control deviation independent of steps/ranks.
  
The absolute deviation in this case is determined by the development of the risk issue at = dr r  i.e.: ( )Γ+αξ ∆ ζ −β drT ( ) / 1 , where we find evidence to the recommendation to initiate controlling mechanisms 
as soon as possible in order to keep the needed force of correction low as well as the deviation from the 
originally determined corridor of tolerated states. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we propose and introduce a fundamental description of dealing with risks, also pointing out 
possible measures to handle risk consequences even on projects where respective surcharges are limited 
to only minor values. The approach is based on the fact that the considered universe in a unique construc-
tion project in technical as well as in commercial respect is in general much too small to rely on any sta-
tistical result. We propose to make use of a well understood development of knowledge regarding the 
risk, based on both the physical manifestation and the awareness of risk which can be easily modeled as a 
function of the skills, education and structure of organization of the project team. The second factor of the 
model is a representation of the actual project by some explicit parameters like complexity, connectivity 
interoperability and impact which can be extracted from the project description in very early stages of the 
execution and are independent of scales. Such parameters allow modeling the controllability of the con-
sidered risk or as an alternative the risk consequences. Future investigation aims at deriving the parame-
ters of interaction directly from non fictional interaction diagrams and normalizing them to scale free sit-
uations. 
Based on these elements we propose to replace the unknown and unforeseeable consequences of a risk 
given only by probabilities but in case of occurrence ruling out every schedule by well defined measures. 
Such can be developed on the background of the derived controllability and valuated by parameters of ef-
ficiency and costs.  
We expect such an approach to provide alternative means to handle risks both on constructional as 
well as on operative tasks even if statistical methods fail. The remaining risk is well defined while the ac-
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tual hazard is compensated by measures which generate costs but can be kept within affordable and calcu-
lable limits. 
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